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AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTH CAROLINA’S 







In 2009, South Carolina passed House Bill 3130.
1
  This bill 
amends various existing South Carolina Code sections and provides 
certain benefits, including tax exemptions and economic development 
bonds to taxpayers who create 3,800 full-time jobs and invest a 
minimum of $750 million within the state.
2
  Although the bill does not 
mention a specific corporation by name, the legislation and the political 
movements that occurred around the time of its drafting strongly 
suggest that it was drafted to incentivize the dominant U.S. aircraft 
manufacturer, The Boeing Company (“Boeing”), to expand its presence 
in South Carolina.
3
  Subsidies, such as those found in House Bill 3130, 
are nothing new to the aircraft industry.
4
  In fact, both Boeing and its 
European rival, Airbus SAS (“Airbus”), have enjoyed the benefits of 
similar subsidies in the past.
5
  Many of these subsidies, however, have 
come under intense scrutiny by the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”).   
The WTO was established in 1995 as an international 
organization that oversees and facilitates international trade.
6
  One 
hundred and fifty-three nations, which together account for over 97% 
                                                 
* Amanda S. Kuker is a joint-degree J.D. and International M.B.A. 
candidate at the University of South Carolina School of Law and Moore School 
of Business, Class of 2012. B.A. German, Davidson College 2008. 
1 H.B. 3130, 118th Gen. Assemb. (S.C. 2009). 
2 Id.   
3 See generally id. 
4 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting 
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/AB/R (May 18, 2011) [hereinafter 
European Communities – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft].  
5 Id.  
6 The WTO in Brief: What is the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Aug. 
28, 2011).  
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of international trade, are members of the WTO.
7
  As a member nation, 
a country participates in the negotiation of and agrees to be bound by 
WTO treaties, which are then ratified in the member nation’s 
parliament.
8
  When disagreements occur between members concerning 
the interpretation of WTO treaties, the WTO provides a dispute 
settlement venue with a “neutral procedure based on an agreed legal 
foundation.”
9
  More specifically, the dispute settlement body of the 
WTO “serves to clarify the provisions of the covered agreements ‘in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law’” as codified in Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.
10
  
                                                 
7 The WTO in Brief:  The Organization, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr02_e.htm (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2011). 
8 Understanding the WTO: Who We Are, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2011). 
9 Id. 
10 Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft (Second Complaint), ¶ 7.1, WT/DS353/R (Mar. 31, 2011) [hereinafter 
U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint)]; 
Vienna Convention art. 31, 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“Article 31 
General rule of interpretation.  1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the 
purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, 
including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty 
which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of 
the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties 
as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into account, 
together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) 
any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 4. A special 
meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. 
Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretation. Recourse may be had to 
supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the 
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when 
the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or 
obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”). 
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For the past seven years, the WTO has attempted to parse through 
complex litigation between Boeing and Airbus.
11
  Each company filed 
an individual case against the other challenging the legality of subsidies 
that its rival received.
12
  Many of the subsidies challenged in these 
cases are similar to the incentives provided by South Carolina, which 
raises the following question:  do the incentives provided by South 
Carolina violate WTO treaty law?   
This paper examines the South Carolina incentive package under 
the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(“SCM Agreement”).  The first section provides a brief overview of the 
background information pertinent to this paper’s discussion including a 
chronology of the aircraft industry and overview of the historical, 
political, and economic context in which the Airbus-Boeing dispute 
arose.  Section II lays out a concise synopsis of the SCM Agreement, 
the core governing law.  In Section III, the substantive analysis of the 
South Carolina incentives begins. This section opens with a description 
of each of the incentives provided for in House Bill 3130.  Then, the 
laws of the SCM Agreement are applied to South Carolina’s House Bill 
3130. The fourth and final section not only summarizes the findings 
outlined in the above sections, but also expounds on tangential issues, 
such as the enforceability of the WTO’s rulings on the Airbus and 
Boeing cases and the atypical development of the aircraft 
manufacturing industry. 
  
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY 
An intense rivalry exists between Airbus and Boeing.  While these 
two main players presently dominate the aircraft industry, this has not 
always been the case. The early aircraft industry in both the United 
States and Europe was highly fragmented.
13
 Boeing stepped out in front 
of its competitors at the height of World War II, when it proved 
uniquely qualified to satisfy the increasing demand for specialized 
military aircraft.  This success eventually crossed over into the civil 
sector in the 1950s, when Boeing unveiled its 707 jetliner.
 14
 
                                                 
11 See generally European Communities – Measures Affecting Trade in 
Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 4. 
12 Id. 
13 Robert Carbaugh & John Olienyk, Boeing-Airbus Subsidy Dispute: An 
Economic and Trade Perspective, 2 GLOBAL ECON. Q. 261, 263 (2001).  
14 Id. at 262. 
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Airbus was formed in 1970 as a Franco-German joint venture, 
created to combat the United States’ dominance of the aircraft 
industry.
15
  To kick-start its growth, Airbus received direct production 
subsidies and government loans that covered up to 80% of its 
development costs,
16
 paid below market interest rates, and occasionally 
benefited from debt forgiveness.
17
  Needless to say, Airbus gradually 
usurped a significant proportion of the formerly United States-
dominated aircraft production market.
18
  By the 1990s, Airbus 
accounted for 30% of all new plane orders, steadily encroaching on 
Boeing’s 60% market share.
19
   
According to United States trade officials, the Airbus subsidies 
breached existing international trade agreements.
20
  More specifically, 
United States trade officials alleged that the European subsidies 
provided Airbus with a distinct competitive advantage: Airbus could 
price its aircrafts at least 10% below cost.
21
  The United States further 
argued that Airbus would most likely never have survived its initial 
years, let alone managed significant growth within the industry, but for 
the generous subsidies Airbus received from European governments.
22
  
This tension marks the beginning of the Airbus-Boeing Dispute, a case 
that will spend years in front of the WTO.   
 
A.  THE AIRBUS-BOEING DISPUTE 
A key factor fueling the Airbus-Boeing Dispute is the duopolistic 
structure of the aircraft industry.  Airbus and Boeing are essentially the 
only two large civil aircraft producers in the aircraft industry.  Thus, 
competition for market share has become a zero-sum game.
23
  In other 
                                                 
15 Boeing v. Airbus: The WTO Dispute that Neither Can Win, DEUTSCHE 
BANK RESEARCH, 4 (Feb. 1, 2007), http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR 
_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000205714.pdf. [hereinafter Boeing v. 
Airbus]. 
16 Carbaugh, supra note 13, at 272. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 262. 
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 272. 
21 Id.  
22 Id. 
23 Annemarie Michaela Spadafore, Excess Baggage: Weighing the 
Contribution of Political and Corporate Interests in the WTO Cases over 
Commercial Aircraft Subsidies 71, (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Miami University) (on file with Miami University). 
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words, whenever a new large civil aircraft product is released, Boeing 
and Airbus compete directly against each other for customers.
24
 Each 
sale closed by one company is a sale lost by the other. The effect of a 
lost sale is exaggerated by the industry’s customer purchase trends.  
The market’s core customers, large airlines and leasing companies,
25
 
tend to enter into multi-billion dollar, long-term contracts that require 
multiple aircraft deliveries from the same producer over the course of 
numerous years.
26
  For example, in 2005, Boeing closed a deal with 
Qantas Airlines for forty-five aircraft plus twenty options and fifty 
purchase rights.
27
  Entering large contracts such as these benefits an 
airline company because it increases aircraft familiarity among the 
company’s pilots.
28
  However, for the aircraft manufacturer, this 
behavior significantly increases the detriment of a lost sale. 
Whether Airbus or Boeing wins a sale frequently boils down to 
one factor:  price.
29
  A hot topic in the Airbus-Boeing Dispute, price is 
often the distinguishing factor between Airbus’s and Boeing’s contract 
bids,
30
 especially considering that nearly every aircraft model produced 
by one company has a direct and nearly identical competitor product 
from the other company.
31
  In such a market environment, subsidies 
become especially controversial because subsidies allow the recipient 
company to either increase its non-operating cash flow or transfer its 
decreased marginal unit cost through to its customers by lowering 
prices.
32
  Furthermore, because each company possesses such a large 
market share, each pricing decision affects the market price for large 
civil aircrafts.
33
  Therefore, subsidies help companies win both sales 
and market share.   
                                                 
24 Executive Summary of the First Written Submission by the European 
Communities, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft, 6, WT/-DS316 (Feb. 19, 2007), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu 
/doclib/docs/2007/march/tradoc_133819.pdf [hereinafter Executive summary]. 
25 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.1689. 
26 Id. ¶ 7.1685. 
27 Id. ¶ 7.1788. 
28 Spadafore, supra note 23, at 71.  
29 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.1694. 
30 Spadafore, supra note 23, at 71. 
31 Boeing v. Airbus, supra note 15, at 3. 
32 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶7.1699. 
33 Id. ¶ 7.1688 (explaining the European Communities’ claim “that most 
airlines that operate LCA are Boeing customers, and provides the following 
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The Airbus-Boeing Dispute began in 2004 when the United States 
terminated the then governing Bilateral EU-US Agreement of Trade in 
Large Civil Aircraft (informally known as the 1992 Agreement) and 
filed a case against the European Communities challenging the 
European Communities’ subsidies to Airbus (“the Airbus case”). 
34 
In 
turn, the European Communities immediately followed suit and filed a 
similar case against the United States challenging the United States’ 
subsidies to Boeing (“the Boeing case”).
35
  The two cases have been in 
front of the WTO for the past seven years.  
In each case, each party argues that the opponent nation’s aircraft 
manufacturing subsidies have enabled the subsidized company to lower 
its costs, use the cost savings to lower the price of aircrafts, win sales, 
and unfairly increase its market share.
36
 In its case against the European 
Communities, the United States challenged seventy-one subsidies 
provided to Airbus by various European Communities, including 
France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
37
  The challenged 
subsidies include launch aid, “grants and government-provided goods 
and services to develop, expand, and upgrade Airbus manufacturing 
sites,” preferential loan terms, forgiveness of debt, and equity infusions, 
among others.
38
 The European Communities’ case against the United 
States challenges subsidies Boeing received from NASA, the 
Department of Defense, and the states of Washington, Kansas, and 
Illinois.
39
   
 
II.  THE GOVERNING LAW:  AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND 
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES 
Since subsidies significantly affect market share in the aircraft 
industry, both Boeing and Airbus desire some level of subsidy 
                                                                                                 
figures: of 764 airlines that operate Airbus and/or Boeing aircraft, 645 operate 
Boeing LCA, 507 operate only Boeing LCA, 119 operate only Airbus LCA.”). 
34 Spadafore, supra note 23, at 33.  
35 Id.  
36 Background Fact Sheet: WTO disputes US/EU Large Civil Aircraft, 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Jan. 31, 2011), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/ 
docs/2010/september/tradoc_146486.pdf [hereinafter Background Fact Sheet]. 
37 DS316 WTO Panel Subsidy Findings – Win/Loss Analysis (2010), THE 
BOEING COMPANY, http://www.boeing.com/aboutus/govt_ops/docs/wto/ 
Win_and_Loss_Analysis.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2011); Executive Summary, 
supra note 24, at 1. 
38 Executive Summary, supra note 24 at 1.  
39 Background Fact Sheet, supra note 36, at 1. 
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regulation.  The body of law that governs subsidy disputes can be found 
in the SCM Agreement. This agreement provides guidelines for 
determining whether government funding in any industry is an 
actionable or prohibited subsidy and how an actionable or prohibited 
subsidy should be remedied. 
The first step in the WTO’s analysis is to determine whether 
government funding qualifies as a subsidy.
40
  Under the SCM 
Agreement, a subsidy is defined broadly as a “‘financial contribution’ 
that confers a ‘benefit’ on its recipient.”
41
  Thus, a subsidy exists if its 
funding satisfies two criteria: (i) it must be a financial contribution to 
the recipient, and (ii) it must confer a benefit on the recipient.
42
  In a 
prior WTO case, US – Softwood Lumber IV, the WTO appellate body 
clarified that the “evaluation of the existence of a financial contribution 
involves consideration of the nature of the transaction through which 
something of economic value is transferred by a government” and that 
“[a] wide range of transactions falls within the meaning of ‘financial 
contribution.’”
43
  Furthermore, funding is deemed to confer a benefit on 
a recipient when it is provided “on terms that are more advantageous 
than those [terms] that would have been available to the recipient on 
                                                 
40 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. 1, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement].  
41 Executive Summary, supra note 24, at 9 (citing SCM Agreement, 
supra note 40, art. 1.1 (stating “1.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a 
subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: (a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a 
government or any public body within the territory of a Member (referred to in 
this Agreement as ‘government’), i.e. where: (i) a government practice involves 
a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans and equity infusion), potential direct 
transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); (ii) government revenue 
that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as 
tax credits); (iii) a government provides goods or services other than general 
infrastructure, or purchases goods; (iv) a government makes payments to a 
funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or 
more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would 
normally be vested in the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs 
from practices normally followed by governments; or (a)(2) there is any form 
of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994; and (b) a 
benefit is thereby conferred.”)). 
42 SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 1(B)(2)(a)(ii).  
43 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.29 (emphasis added) (citing Appellate Body 
Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, ¶ 52, WT/DS257/AB/RW (Dec. 5, 2005)). 
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  Insight into the interpretation of this benefit requirement 
is explained in WTO appellate precedent:  
[T]he word ‘benefit,’ as used in Article 1.1(b), 
implies some kind of comparison.  This must be so, 
for there can be no ‘benefit’ to the recipient unless 
the ‘financial contribution’ makes the recipient 
‘better off’ than it would otherwise have been, absent 
that contribution.  In our view, the marketplace 
provides an appropriate basis for comparison in 
determining whether a ‘benefit’ has been ‘conferred,’ 
because the trade-distorting potential of a ‘financial 
contribution’ can be identified by determining 
whether the recipient has received a ‘financial 
contribution’ on terms more favourable than those 
available to the recipient in the market.
45
 
Precedent also demonstrates, however, that generally “the financial 
contribution clearly confers a benefit, in as much as [the taxpayer] need 
not pay certain taxes that would otherwise be due.”
 46
   
This broad definition covers a number of contributions, including 
the following contributions, which were challenged by the European 
Communities in its WTO case against the United States:  “direct and 
potential direct transfers of funds . . . ; government revenue otherwise 
due that is foregone or not collected . . . ; and provision of goods or 
services other than general infrastructure . . . .” 
47
  Not all funding 
satisfying the above criteria violates the SCM Agreement.  Rather, a 
subsidy is permitted under the SCM Agreement so long as the subsidy 
in question is neither prohibited nor specific.
48
   
A subsidy is prohibited if it falls under one of the forms listed in 
Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement.
49
  Prohibited subsidies include 
                                                 
44 Id. ¶ 7.114.  
45 Id. ¶ 7.30 (emphasis added) (citing Appellate Body Report, Canada – 
Aircraft, ¶ 157, WT/DS70/AB/RW (July 21, 2000)).   
46 Id. ¶ 7.169 (citing Panel Report, US – FSC, ¶ 7.103, WT/DS108/R 
(Oct. 8, 1999)). 
47 Id. ¶ 7.26. 
48 European Communities – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft, supra note 4; SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 1.2 (stating “A 
subsidy as defined in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provisions of Part II or 
shall be subject to the provisions of Part III or V only if such a subsidy is 
specific in accordance with the provisions of Article 2.”). 
49 Executive Summary, supra note 24, at 10. 
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“subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of 
several other conditions, upon export performance” and “subsidies 
contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon 
the use of domestic over imported goods.”
50
  To determine whether a 
subsidy is prohibited in law, or de jure, the panel must focus solely on 
the text of the legislative authority.
51
  If a subsidy is prohibited in fact, 
or de facto, the panel may consider circumstantial evidence.
52
  WTO 
precedent provides that de facto export contingency requires three 
criteria: (i) a subsidy must be granted, (ii) which is tied to (iii) the 
actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings.
53
  According to the 
appellate body, “tied to” implies a “relationship of ‘conditionality or 
dependence’” and may be rephrased as “contingent upon.”
54
   
Actionable but not prohibited subsidies fall under Article 2 of the 
SCM Agreement.  Generally, a subsidy is specific if its application is 
explicitly limited to “an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or 
industries.”
55
  According to prior WTO rulings, specificity analysis is 
unique to each case:   
At some point that is not made precise in the text of 
the [SCM Agreement], and which may modulate 
according to the particular circumstances of a given 
case, a subsidy would cease to be specific because it 
is sufficiently broadly available throughout an 
economy as not to benefit a particular limited group 
of producers of certain products.  The plain words of 
Article 2.1 indicate that specificity is a general 
concept, and the breadth or narrowness of specificity 
is not susceptible to rigid quantitative definition.  
                                                 
50 SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 3.1.  
51 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.1518. 
52 Id.  
53 SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 3.1(a) n.4; Accord U.S. – 
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), supra 
note 10, ¶ 7.1519 (citing Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, ¶ 169, 
WT/DS70/AB/RW (July 21, 2000)). 
54 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.1520. 
55  SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 2.1. 
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However, Article 2 outlines factors that may be considered to 
determine whether a subsidy is specific.  Factors to consider in 
determining specificity include the “use of a subsidy programme by a 
limited number of certain enterprises, predominant use by certain 
enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy 
to certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has been 
exercised by the granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy.”
57
  
A subsidy that sets out objective criteria or conditions governing 
eligibility is not specific.
58
   
A specific subsidy is also actionable if it results in “adverse 
effects” to the challenging party.
59
  The SCM Agreement provides that 
“[N]o Member should cause, through the use of any subsidy referred to 
in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 1, adverse effects to the interests of 
other Members."
60
  The term “adverse effects” is to be understood 
within the meaning of Articles 5(a) and 5(c) of the SCM Agreement as 
present
61
 “injury to the domestic industry of another member” and 
“serious prejudice to the interest of another member.”
62
  Under Section 
6.3 of the SCM Agreement, “serious prejudice” occurs if the subsidy 
can be linked to one or more of the following effects: 
(i) displacement or impediment of imports into the subsidizing 
member’s market,  
(ii) displacement or impediment of exports of another member 
into third country markets,  
                                                 
56 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.31 (emphasis added) (citing Panel Report, US –
Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 7.1142, WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004)). 
57 SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 2.1(c). 
58 Id. art. 2.1(b). 
59 Executive Summary, supra note 24, at 2. 
60 SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 5. 
61 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.1654 (“Article 5 Adverse Effects:  No Member 
should cause, through the use of any subsidy referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 
of Article 1, adverse effects to the interests of other Members, i.e.: (a) injury to 
the domestic industry of another Member; (b) nullification or impairment of 
benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other Members under GATT 1994 in 
particular the benefits of concessions bound under Article II of GATT 1994; (c) 
serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.”). 
62 SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 5(a), 5(c). 
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(iii) significant price undercutting as compared to another member 
in the same market or the generation of significant price 
suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market, 
or  
(iv) an increase of world market share for a particular product of 
the subsidized member after a subsidy is received compared to 
the subsidized member’s average market share during the 
previous 3 years.
63
   
The panel in the Boeing case interpreted Article 6.3 to “require the 
establishment of a causal link between the subsidies in question and the 
particular form of serious prejudice.”
64
  However, because the Article 
does not include the word “cause,” the panel reasoned that there is a 
“certain degree of discretion in selecting an appropriate methodology 
for determining whether the “effect” of a subsidy is any of the 
phenomena set forth in Articles 6.3(a) through (d)” that the panel may 
use in reaching its decisions.
65
  Accordingly, the panel made the 
following proposal: 
                                                 
63 Id. art. 6.1-6.2 (“Article 6, Serious Prejudice:  6.1 Serious prejudice in 
the sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 shall be deemed to exist in the case of: 
(a) the total ad valorem subsidization of a product exceeding 5 per cent; (b) 
subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an industry; (c) subsidies to 
cover operating losses sustained by an enterprise, other than one-time measures 
which are non-recurrent and cannot be repeated for that enterprise and which 
are given merely to provide time for the development of long-term solutions 
and to avoid acute social problems; (d) direct forgiveness of debt, i.e. 
forgiveness of government-held debt, and grants to cover debt repayment.”). 
64 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.1656; See also, Panel Report, US –Subsidies on 
Upland Cotton, ¶ 7.1341, WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004); Appellate Body 
Report, US – Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil), ¶ 372, WT/DS267/AB/RW 
(June 2, 2008) (supporting this conclusion with the ordinary meaning of the 
language in the Article as well as Article 5) (“Although Article 6.3 does not use 
the word ‘cause’, the Panel considers that the sub-paragraphs of Article 6.3 
require the establishment of a causal link between the subsidies in question and 
the particular form of serious prejudice. This interpretation of Article 6.3 
accords with the ordinary meaning of the terms ‘arise’ and ‘effect’, and finds 
contextual support in Article 5(c) and Part V of the SCM Agreement.  Article 
5(c) provides that no Member should cause serious prejudice to the interests of 
another Member through the use of any subsidy.“). 
65 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.1656 (citing Appellate Body Report, US – 
Upland Cotton, ¶ 436 WT/DS267/AB/RW (June 2, 2008)) (discussing the 
approach to causation and non-attribution taken by the compliance panel in that 
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The panel proposes to adopt a counterfactual 
approach to determining whether the ‘effects’ of the 
subsidies at issue in this dispute are displacement or 
impedance, significant lost sales or significant price 
suppression . . . first by examining the effects of the 
subsidies on Boeing's LCA commercial behaviour 
(i.e. Boeing's prices and product offerings) and 
secondly by examining the effects of the subsidies, 
through their effects on Boeing’s commercial 
behaviour, on Airbus’ prices and sales in the specific 
product markets.
66
   
As part of this analysis, the panel will also consider “non-attribution” 
factors to “ensure that the effects of other factors on prices do not dilute 
the causal link between the subsidies and the price suppression.”
67
  In 
summary, the panel looks for a “genuine and substantial relationship of 
cause and effect between the subsidy in question and the displacement 
or impedance, significant lost sales, or significant price suppression.”
68
  
“Serious prejudice” is analyzed using a two prong test:  (i) does the 
evidence suggest that the effect of the subsidy falls into one of the 
situations identified in Article 6.3(a) through (c),
69
 and (ii) did the 
specific subsidy cause these effects?
70
  
Notwithstanding the above, Article 8 provides for the exception of 
certain specific subsidies.  Subsidies for research up to 75% of 
                                                                                                 
dispute (in the context of a claim of significant price suppression)) (“[A] panel 
has a certain degree of discretion in selecting an appropriate methodology for 
determining whether the 'effect' of a subsidy is significant price suppression.”).  
66 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.1659. 
67 Id. ¶ 7.1660 (citing Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton 
(Article 21.5 – Brazil), ¶ 375, WT/DS267AB/RW (June 2, 2008)). 
68 Id. ¶ 7.1662. 
69 SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 6.3 (“Serious prejudice in the 
sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 may arise in any case where one or several 
of the following apply:  (a) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the 
imports of a like product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing 
Member; (b) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the exports of a 
like product of another  Member from a third country market;  (c) the effect of 
the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product as 
compared with the price of a like product of another Member in the same 
market or significant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in the 
same market.”).  
70 European Communities – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft, supra note 4. 
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industrial costs or 50% of precompetitive development activity, as well 
as subsidies aiding disadvantaged regions of the member’s territory, 
will be deemed non-actionable notwithstanding evidence to the 
contrary under Articles 3 through 7.
71
  A subsidy is also non-actionable 
if the government or other granting authority “establishes objective 
conditions governing the eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy . . 
. provided that the eligibility is automatic and that such criteria and 
conditions are strictly adhered to.”
72
   
 
III. BOEING IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
Despite the ongoing Airbus-Boeing Dispute currently before the 
WTO, both parties are continuing operations, which includes accepting 
new subsidies.  One of the most recent subsidies to Boeing came from 
the State of South Carolina in House Bill 3130 (“H.B. 3130”).
73
 
A. THE SOUTH CAROLINA INCENTIVES PACKAGE 
House Bill 3130 amends South Carolina Code Section 12-6-2320, 
Section 12-36-2120, and Sections 11-41-20 through 90.
 74
  This 2009 
bill provides certain benefits for up to ten years to taxpayers who meet 
two requirements.  First, the taxpayer must invest at least $750 million 
in real or personal property in a single county in South Carolina.  
Second, the taxpayer must create at least 3,800 new and full-time jobs 
within seven years.
75
 In return, the taxpayer receives income and sales 
tax exemptions as well as economic development bonds.
76
  
House Bill 3130 amended Section 12-6-2320 to expand the 
definition of allowable arrangement for income tax reductions with 
taxpayers.
77
  Prior to the bill, South Carolina could enter into 
agreements with taxpayers under Section 12-6-2320(B)(3)(a) for up to 
ten years if the taxpayer was:  
[P]lanning a new facility in this State or an expansion 
of an existing facility and the new or expanded 
facility result[ed] in a total investment of at least ten 
million dollars and the creation of at least two 
                                                 
71 SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 8. 
72 Id. art. 2.1 (b). 
73 H.B. 3130, 118th Gen. Assemb. (S.C. 2009). 
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hundred new full-time jobs, with an average cash 
compensation level for the new jobs of more than 
three times the per capita income of this State at the 
time the jobs [were] filled which must [have been] 
within five years.
78
   
The amendment altered this section by adding Paragraph 3(a)(ii), 
which provides for an alternative set of conditions under which the 
State may enter into an agreement with a taxpayer if “the taxpayer is 
planning a new facility in this State and invests at least seven hundred 
fifty million dollars in real or personal property or both in a single 
county in this State and creates at least three thousand eight hundred 
full-time new jobs” within seven years.
79
  The main changes in the 
amendment are the increase in required investment from $10 million to 
$750 million and the increase in required job creation from 200 to 
3,800.  These changes reflect the State’s anticipation of a significant 
arrangement with a large corporation.   
House Bill 3130 also amends Section 12-36-2120 by adding new 
paragraphs that expand the current sales tax exemptions for aircraft 
fuel, computer equipment, and construction materials.
80
  The sales tax 
exemptions for aircraft fuel are covered in Paragraph 9(e) and (f).
81
  
This paragraph removes the sales tax from:  
coal, or coke or other fuel sold to manufacturers, 
electric power companies, and transportation 
companies for . . . (e) the generation of motive power 
for test flights of aircraft by the manufacturer of the 
aircraft [and] (f) the transportation of an aircraft prior 
to its completion from one facility of the 
manufacturer of the aircraft to another facility of the 
manufacturer of the aircraft, not including the 
transportation of major component parts for 
construction or assembly, or the transportation of 
personnel.
82
   
Under new Paragraph 65(b) of Section 12-36-2120, the sales tax 
exemption is expanded to broadly cover “computer equipment” used at 
                                                 
78 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2320 (2008).  
79 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-2320(B)(3) (2010). 
80 H.B. 3130, 118th Gen. Assemb. (S.C. 2009). 
81 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-2190(9)(e)-(f).  
82 Id.  
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Boeing’s expanded North Charleston plant.
83
  “Computer equipment” is 
defined in Section (65)(c) as follows: 
original or replacement servers, routers, switches, 
power units, network devices, hard drives, 
processors, memory modules, motherboards, racks, 
other computer hardware and components, cabling, 
cooling apparatus, and related or ancillary equipment, 
machinery, and components, the primary purpose of 
which is to store, retrieve, aggregate, search, 
organize, process, analyze, or transfer data or any 
combination of these, or to support related computer 
engineering or computer science research.
84
  
Lastly, construction materials are exempted in amended Section 
12-36-2120(67).
85
  House Bill 3130 amended this section to include in 
the existing exemption for construction materials an exemption for 
“construction materials used in the construction of a new or expanded 
single manufacturing facility.”
86
   
Each of the tax incentives is linked to a claw-back provision.
 87
  
Under these provisions, the State is allowed to “assess any tax due as a 
result of the taxpayer’s failure to meet the requirements.”
88
  These 
provisions protect the State in the chance that Boeing does not meet 
and maintain the investment or employment levels required by the code 
amendments.  
House Bill 3130 also amends numerous sections of the State 
General Obligation Economic Development Bond Act, which permits 
the issuance of economic development bonds under certain 
circumstances.
89
  More specifically, these economic development 
bonds, more formally known as “state general obligation development 
                                                 
83 Id. § 12-36-2120(65)(b).  
84 Id.  
85 Id. § 12-36-2120(67). 
86 Id. 
87 THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF BOEING IN SOUTH CAROLINA, MILEY & 
ASSOCIATES, INC. 11 (2010), available at http://scfuture.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2010/05/Economic-Impact-of-Boeing.pdf.  
88  See generally H.B. 3130, 118th Gen. Assemb. (S.C. 2009); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 12-6-2320(B)(4) (2010); See also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-36-2120(9), 
(65)(e), (67) (2010). 
89 S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-41-40 (2010). 
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bonds,” are limited in application to “financing for infrastructure,”
90
 
which includes:   
land acquisition, site preparation, road and highway 
improvements, rail spur construction, water service, 
wastewater treatment, employee training which may 
include equipment used for such purpose, 
environmental mitigation, training and research 
facilities and the necessary equipment therefore, 
buildings and renovations to buildings whether new 
or existing (i) associated with an economic 
development project as defined in Section 11-41-
30(2) that includes air carrier hub terminal facilities 
as defined in Section 55-11-500(a), or (ii) located on 
land that is owned by the State or an agency, 
instrumentality, or political subdivision thereof.
91
  
A total of $270 million was approved to incentivize Boeing to 
expand its plant in South Carolina.
92
  Of this amount, $220 million 
were approved as general obligation bonds.
93
  Typically, the amount of 
general obligation debt
94
 that the State of South Carolina may incur is 
limited annually to a certain percentage of the general revenues of the 
state for the previous year.
95
  However, there is no numerical ceiling on 
the amount of general obligation debt that may be authorized by a two-
thirds vote of the members of each House of the General Assembly,
96
 
so long as the debt is incurred for a public purpose.
97
  Further support 
for this unlimited indebtedness may be found in Article 5 of the South 
Carolina Constitution: 
[i]f general obligation debt be authorized by (a) two-
thirds of the members of each House of the General 
Assembly; or (b) by a majority vote of the qualified 
electors of the State voting in a referendum called by 
the General Assembly there shall be no conditions or 
restrictions limiting the incurring of such 
                                                 
90 Id. 
91 Id. § 11-41-30(3)(a)-(j) (emphasis added). 
92 Project Gemini Agreement, Boeing Company-South Carolina, Jan. 1, 
2010, 3 (on file with author) [hereinafter Project Gemini Agreement]. 
93 Id.  
94 This excludes highway bonds, state institution bonds, tax anticipation 
notes, and bond anticipation notes. 
95 See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-41-20 (2010). 
96 Id. § 11-41-20 (5). 
97 S.C. Const. art. X, §13(3). 
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indebtedness except (i) those restrictions and 
limitations imposed in the authorization to incur such 
indebtedness, and (ii) the provisions of subsection (3) 
hereof [requiring a public purpose]. 
98
 
Pursuant to Section 13(5) of Article X of the Constitution, House 
Bill 3130 amended South Carolina Code Section 11-41-50(B)
99
 to 
allow for economic development bonds up to an aggregate principal of 
$170 million.
100
  The remainder of the economic bonds were authorized 
as follows:  $40 million of general obligation bonds, subject to the 
maximum annual debt limit, reallocated from a previous project 
pursuant to Section 11-41-50(A),
101
 (ii) an additional $10 million 
                                                 
98 Id. § 13(5).  
99 S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-41-50(B) (2010) (“In addition to and exclusive of 
the economic development bonds provided for and issued pursuant to 
subsection (A) of this section, the General Assembly provides that pursuant 
to Section 13(5), Article X of the Constitution of this State, 1895, (i) additional 
economic development bonds may be issued under this chapter in an aggregate 
principal amount that does not exceed one hundred seventy million dollars, and 
(ii) in addition to the authorization contained in the preceding clause, additional 
economic development bonds may be issued provided that the aggregate 
principal amount of economic development bonds then outstanding under 
clauses (i) and (ii), together with the economic development bonds to be issued 
pursuant to this clause (ii), does not at any time exceed the principal amount 
specified in clause (i). From the proceeds of the economic development bonds 
authorized pursuant to this subsection, no more than a total of one hundred 
seventy million dollars of proceeds may be used for any one project regardless 
of available capacity.”). 
100 Id. (“(i) additional economic development bonds may be issued under 
this chapter in an aggregate principal amount that does not exceed one hundred 
seventy million dollars, and (ii) in addition to the authorization contained in the 
preceding clause, additional economic development bonds may be issued 
provided that the aggregate principal amount of economic development bonds 
then outstanding under clauses (i) and (ii), together with the economic 
development bonds to be issued pursuant to this clause (ii), does not at any time 
exceed the principal amount specified in clause (i).”). 
101 Letter from Joe Taylor, Secretary of the Department of Commerce, to 
the South Carolina State Budget and Control Board, (Jan. 8, 2010) (on file with 
author); S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-41-50(A) (2010) (“Pursuant to Section 13(6)(c), 
Article X of the Constitution of this State, 1895, the General Assembly 
provides that economic development bonds may be issued pursuant to this 
subsection at such times as the maximum annual debt service on all general 
obligation bonds of the State, including economic development bonds 
outstanding and being issued, but excluding research university infrastructure 
bonds pursuant to Chapter 51 of this title, highway bonds, state institution 
bonds, tax anticipation notes, and bond anticipation notes, will not exceed five 
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and (iii) $50 million authorized 
as Air Carrier Bonds under the Air Carrier Hub Terminal Facilities Act 
codified in Section 55-11-520(A), in return for which Boeing 
committed itself to operate the air carrier hub facility.
103
 
In addition to the state provided benefits, Boeing also receives 
local incentives.  One of the more significant incentives provided by 
Charleston County is the Fee-In-Lieu-of-Tax (“FILOT”)
104
 codified in 
Chapter 44 of Title 12 of the South Carolina Code.  FILOT is an 
incentive mechanism that reduces property taxes for new or expanding 
businesses.
105
 Boeing’s investment is locked in to an assessment rate of 
4%, a rate significantly lower than the standard industrial property 
assessment rate of 10.5%.
106
  At this rate, Boeing will pay taxes at a 
fixed millage rate of 269.8 mills over the thirty year term.
107
  
                                                                                                 
and one-half percent of the general revenues of the State for the fiscal year next 
preceding, excluding revenues which are authorized to be pledged for state 
highway bonds and state institution bonds. The State at any time may not issue 
general obligation bonds, excluding economic development bonds issued 
pursuant to this chapter, research university infrastructure bonds issued 
pursuant to Chapter 51 of this title, highway bonds, state institution bonds, tax 
anticipation notes, and bond anticipation notes, if at the time of issuance the 
maximum annual debt service on all such general obligation bonds, outstanding 
and being issued exceeds five percent of the general revenues of the State for 
the fiscal year next preceding, excluding revenues which are authorized to be 
pledged for state highway bonds and state institution bonds.”). 
102 Letter from Joe Taylor, supra note 101, at 2. 
103 Project Gemini Agreement, supra note 92, at 3;  S.C. CODE ANN. § 
55-11-520(A) (2010) (“Pursuant to the provisions of subsection 6(c), Section 
13, Article 10 of the Constitution of this State, in order to provide funds to pay 
a portion of the costs of (1) acquiring land, (2) constructing, enlarging, 
improving, extending, renovating, and equipping suitable air carrier hub 
terminal facilities to be located in this State, (3) purchasing equipment, ground 
support equipment, machinery, special tools, maintenance, boarding facilities, 
and any and all additional necessary real or personal property for the operation 
of air carrier hub terminal facilities, and (4) if petitioned by a special purpose 
district or other political subdivision of the State, to pay a portion or all of the 
costs described in Section 55-11-510, not exceeding fifty million dollars of 
general obligation bonds of this State, to be outstanding at any time may be 
issued in the manner provided in this article and by law.”). 
104 Project Gemini Agreement, supra note 92, at 3, 13. 
105 Id. at 3. 
106 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-44-50 (2010); Project Gemini Agreement, supra 
note 92, at 3. 
107 Charleston County Financial Incentives for The Boeing Company 
Final Assembly Project, CHARLESTON COUNTY GOVERNMENT ONLINE (2010), 
http://www.charlestoncounty.org/departments/council/Boeing 
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Charleston County also offered Boeing Special Source Revenue Credits 
(SSRC) under South Carolina Code Section 4-29-68.
108
  As a result, for 
the first fifteen years of the FILOT program, a 50% credit will be 
applied.
109
 In other words, 50% of the revenue from the FILOT 
payments is returned to Boeing during the first fifteen years, essentially 
reducing Boeing’s assessment rate to 2%.
110
  Charleston County 
estimates that the FILOT program will raise $138.6 million over the 
course of thirty years, representing 74% of Boeing’s payments.
111
  The 
remaining 26%, or $49.8 million, is returned to Boeing.
112
  
In addition to the FILOT, Boeing also received a Multi-County 
Industrial Park designation under South Carolina Code Section 4-1-
175.  As a result of this designation, Boeing was qualified to receive the 
SSRC.  This designation also allowed Boeing to use job tax credits to 
offset state corporate income taxes and qualified it for a Set-Aside and 
Utility Credit Grant, which included $5 million for site preparation 





B.  LEGALITY OF THE INCENTIVES UNDER THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION’S SCM AGREEMENT 
The question of whether South Carolina’s incentives are illegal 
subsidies under the WTO should be answered in light of the most 
recent WTO panel ruling on the Boeing case, the European 
Communities’ case against the United States filed as part of the Airbus-
Boeing dispute.  Accordingly, the following analysis will mirror the 
analytical process implemented by the panel and apply the terms of the 
SCM Agreement in accord with their application in the Boeing case. 
 
                                                                                                 
FinancialIncentives1-12-10.pdf [hereinafter Charleston County Financial 
Incentives].  
108 Id. 
109 THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF BOEING IN SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 
87, at 13. 
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1.  WHETHER A SUBSIDY EXISTS WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 1 
OF THE SCM AGREEMENT 
In analyzing the legality of South Carolina’s incentive package 
under the SCM Agreement, the first determination must be whether 
each incentive individually qualifies as a subsidy as defined in Article 1 
of the SCM Agreement.  As discussed in depth above, a subsidy is 
defined as a financial contribution in the form of either foregone 
government revenue otherwise due, or a direct transfer of funds, in each 
case that confer a benefit on the recipient.
114
   
The South Carolina tax exemptions would most likely qualify as a 
subsidy because the tax rate reductions provide a financial contribution 
that confers a benefit on the recipient.  The reduction in tax rate is 
clearly not a direct transfer of funds; however, the sales tax rate 
reductions for certain applications of aircraft fuel, computer equipment, 
and construction materials provided to Boeing may constitute foregone 
government revenue otherwise due.  The panel’s previous interpretation 
of these requirements suggests that the tax rate provided in the 
incentives package should be contrasted against the general “tax rules 
applied by the Member in question.”
115
  If a member state has a general 
rule of taxation, the analysis is a but-for test:  government revenue is 
otherwise due where the company would have to pay a certain amount 
of money to the government but for the incentives.
116
  Where a general 
rate of taxation is difficult to define, the panel has acknowledged that it 
looks to “the fiscal treatment of legitimately comparable income to 
determine whether the contested measure involves the foregoing of 
revenue which is ‘otherwise due.’”
117
   
There is a general rate of taxation in South Carolina.  In South 
Carolina, the sales and use tax is set state- and industry-wide at 6%, 
with an additional 1% in certain local governments.
118
  However, the 
legislation has carved out certain exclusions for manufacturers.  South 
Carolina Regulation 117-302, Manufacturers, Processors, 
Compounders, Miners and Quarries, points to several exclusions in 
                                                 
114 SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 1.1. 
115 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.116. 
116 Id. ¶ 7.118.  
117 Id. ¶ 7.119. 
118 Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-910 (2010) (providing a 5% rate), 
and S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-1110 (2010) (adding an additional 1% to the 
general rate, “penny tax”), with U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft (Second Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.709. 
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Code Section 12-36-120 and exemptions in Code Section 12-36-
2120.
119
  Section 12-36-120 excludes from the state sales statutes the 
sale of “tangible personal property to a manufacturer or compounder as 
an ingredient or component part of the tangible personal property or 
products manufactured or compounded for sale” and “tangible personal 
property used directly
120
 in manufacturing, compounding, or processing 
tangible personal property into products for sale.”
121
  Furthermore, 
Section 12-36-2120, discussed in depth above, provides specific sales 
tax exemptions, into which exemptions in subsections (9)(e) and (f), 
(65) and (67) were inserted as part of the Boeing deal.
122
  
Because the tax rate exemptions provide an exceptional rate that 
requires Boeing to pay less in taxes, the tax exemptions likely qualify 
as a financial contribution.  South Carolina Regulation 117-302, 
“[m]anufacturers . . . enjoy several exclusions and exemptions from the 
sales and use taxes,” suggests that these exemptions are at a preferential 
or exceptional rate.
123
   
The exceptional treatment of the incentives such as aircraft fuel, 
computers, and construction materials in Code Section 12-36-2120 is 
                                                 
119 S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 117-302 (2011).   
120 Id. at 117-302.1  (“[B]y ‘used directly’ is meant that the materials or 
products so used come in direct contact with and contribute to bring about 
some chemical or physical change in the ingredient or component properties 
during the period in which the fabricating, converting or processing takes place. 
It is not necessary that such materials or products be used up or entirely 
consumed, provided there is a compliance with the requirements set forth 
herein. These exclusions apply to: (a) odorants purchased by gas companies 
and used in compounding gas for sale.(b) chemicals, such as soda, ash, alum, 
chlorine, etc., used in treating water for sale by municipalities and others 
engaged in the business of processing or compounding water for sale.(c) 
refrigerants used by manufacturers to produce ice for sale.(d) acetylene, 
oxygen, and other gases sold to manufacturers or compounders which enter into 
and become an ingredient or component part of the tangible personal property 
or products which he manufactures or compounds for sale, or which are used 
directly in fabricating, converting, or processing the materials or products being 
manufactured or compounded for sale.(e) plates attached by the manufacturer 
to his product for identification purposes and which become a part of the 
product. These exclusions do not apply to sales of acetylene, oxygen, and other 
gases for use by repairman, welders, dentists, junk dealers, and others are 
subject to the sales or use tax, whichever applies.”).  
121 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-120(2)-(3) (2010).  
122 See id. § 12-36-120; S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-2120(9), (65) (2010). 
123 S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 117-302 (2011) (emphasis added); Cf. U.S. – 
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), supra 
note 10, ¶ 7.126.  
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further highlighted by the language in South Carolina Regulation 117-
302, which specifically differentiates between “exclusions” and 
“exemptions.”
124
  Whereas the broader “exclusions” in Section 12-3-
120 fall outside the sales tax statute’s applicability, the “exemptions” 
fall within the statute, but are released from the obligation.  The nature 
of exemptions themselves implies that if the exemptions were repealed, 
the items exempted from sales tax would otherwise fall under the 
general rule of taxation and the revenue from tax on those items would 
be realized by the State as increased revenue.   
Likewise, the FILOT agreement between Boeing and the County 
of Charleston and the related SSRC would also qualify as subsidies 
because the property tax fee, which Boeing has agreed to pay in lieu of 
certain local property taxes, and which is further reduced by the SSRC, 
constitutes a financial contribution that confers a benefit.  Under 
Section 12-43-220(a), “[a]ll real and personal property owned by or 
leased to manufacturers and utilities and used by the manufacturer or 
utility in the conduct of the business must be taxed on an assessment 
equal to ten and one-half percent of the fair market value of the 
property.”
125
  However, under the FILOT agreement, Boeing is locked 
in at a 4% assessment rate.
126
  This assessment rate is further reduced 
by the SSRC, pursuant to which 50% of the FILOT payments are 
credited to Boeing for the first fifteen years.
127
  Thus, Boeing’s 
assessment rate for property taxes in Charleston is 2% for the first 
fifteen years and 4% for years fifteen through thirty.  In saving up to 
8.5% in property taxes, Boeing is receiving a preferential fee in lieu of 
the standard taxation rate of 10.5% in return for its investment in 
Charleston.   
Furthermore, the terminology of the Fee Agreement between 
Boeing and Charleston County confirms the conclusion that the FILOT 
                                                 
124 S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 117-302 (2011) (“The exclusions can be found 
in Code Section 12-36-120 and includes containers, ingredients and component 
parts, and items used directly in manufacturing, compounding or processing 
tangible personal property for sale. The exemptions can be found in Code 
Section 12-36-2120 and include exemptions for coal, coke, fuel, electricity, and 
machines.”). 
125 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-43-220(a)(1) (2010), amended effective Jan. 1, 
2011. 
126 Fee Agreement, by and between Charleston County, South Carolina 
and The Boeing Company, CHARLESTON COUNTY GOVERNMENT ONLINE, § 5.2 
(Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.charlestoncounty.org/departments /council/Boeing 
FeeAgreementWithChasCounty.pdf.  
127 Id. § 1.1(b)(9)(c). 
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is an exceptional rate compared to the general rate of taxation.  In 
Section 2.2 of the Fee Agreement, Charleston County and Boeing agree 
that Boeing shall be exempt from ad valorem property taxes in the state 
and in return, Boeing is obligated to pay a fee at a lower rate.
128
  The 
agreement itself compares the preferential rate to the rate agreed to in 
the FILOT agreement, referring in multiple sections to “property taxes 
that would be due with respect to such property, if it were taxable” and 
“if it were otherwise subject to ad valorem taxes.”
129
  Furthermore, the 
parties to the agreement acknowledge in Section 5.4 that the agreement 
is intended “to afford Boeing the benefits . . . in consideration of 
Boeing’s decision to locate the Project within the County,” further 




The Economic Development Bonds are also a subsidy under 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) of the SCM Agreement.  Neither Washington, 
Illinois, nor Kansas provided general obligation bonds to Boeing 
similar to those provided by South Carolina.  However, the analysis 
implemented by the panel regarding Kansas Development Finance 
Authority Bonds (KDFA bonds) provides valuable insight into how the 
SCM Agreement would apply to general obligation bonds.  Kansas 
legislation provided up to $500 million in bonds to Boeing as “an 
eligible business for an eligible project” so long as Boeing (i) paid at 
least $600 million in average gross compensation, (ii) paid at least 
$50,000 average annual compensation per employee, (iii) invested at 
least $1 billion in real or tangible personable property in Kansas, and 
(iv) operated in the manufacturing sector during the three taxable years 
immediately preceding application for benefits.
131
  An eligible business 
must repay these funds with interest, but payments are made from an 
account in which the income taxes withheld from the eligible 
business’s employees are deposited.
132
  The panel determined the bonds 
were a subsidy in the form of a direct transfer of funds.
133
  Because, in 
this case, the eligible business owns its own bonds, the business 
                                                 
128 Id. § 2.2, 5.1(a). South Carolina does not collect property taxes at the 
state level. Instead, property taxes are collected by individual counties. 
129 Id. § 5.1(a)-(b) (emphasis added).  
130 Id. § 5.4.  
131U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶¶ 7.822-7.823 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-
50,136 (2004)). 
132 Id. ¶ 7.824. 
133 Id. ¶ 7.832.  
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essentially receives a direct grant from Kansas in the amount of the 
interest due on the bonds.
134
   
Just as the net effect of the KDFA bond issuances was a grant, the 
net effect of the development bonds is also a direct transfer of funds in 
the form of a grant.
135
  Although Boeing will pay rent for the property 
(which is owned by the state), Boeing is under no obligation to repay 
the development bonds.
136
  Furthermore, Boeing pays no tax upon 
receipt of the bonds, and the interest on the bonds is paid by the 
State.
137
  Essentially, Boeing received an infrastructure-related grant in 
the amount of the economic development.  Therefore, the general 
obligation bonds from South Carolina constitute a financial 
contribution in the form of a direct transfer of funds.  
The development bonds also confer a benefit on Boeing.  With 
respect to direct transfers of funds, a benefit is conferred when the 
company “received a financial contribution more favourable than that 
available on the market.”
138
  The panel found that the financial 
contribution from the KDFA bonds was more favorable than market 
terms because the bonds required neither loan repayment nor interest 
payments.
139
  According to the panel, “on the marketplace, any such 
transfer of funds would be accompanied by a requirement that the sum 
be repaid with interest.”
140
  Furthermore, precedent provides that 
“financial contributions in the form of grants confer a benefit.”
141
 
According to the panel’s reasoning in the Boeing case ruling, 
where a tax measure “constitutes a financial contribution, a benefit is 
conferred.”
142
  Thus, in qualifying as either government revenue 
otherwise due but foregone or a direct transfer of funds, and in 
conferring a benefit, the South Carolina sales tax exemptions, FILOT 
agreement, and general obligation bond incentives more than likely all 
qualify as subsidies under Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.  
                                                 
134 Id. ¶ 7.827.  
135 See id. ¶ 7.827.    
136See generally State General Obligation Economic Development Act, 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-41-10 to -180 (2010).  
137 Id.  
138 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.834 (citing Appellate Body Report, Canada – 
Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, Recourse by Brazil to 




142 Id. ¶ 7.171. 
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2.  WHETHER THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUBSIDIES ARE SPECIFIC WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE SCM AGREEMENT? 
However, not all subsidies violate the SCM Agreement; it only 
prohibits specific subsidies.  As discussed above, Article 2 provides 
that a subsidy is specific if the “granting authority, or the legislation 
pursuant to which the granting authority operates, explicitly limits 
access to a subsidy to ‘certain enterprises’” in either the text of the 
granting legislation or in other statements and expressions of intent by 
the granting authority.
143
 In the recent Boeing case, the panel focused 
on the term “explicitly,” interpreting it to mean that the “limitation 
must ‘distinctly express all that is meant; leaving nothing merely 
implied or suggested.’”
144
 While the panel clarified that the limitation 
must be “‘unambiguous’ and ‘clear,’” it also acknowledged that “there 
is some tipping point, which varies on a case-by-case basis, at which 
access to the subsidy in issue is no longer considered limited to ‘certain 
enterprises’ but rather is ‘sufficiently broadly available’ throughout an 
economy so as to be non-specific.”
145
  A subsidy is not specific, 
however, if the granting authority outlines objective standards that 
automatically determine whether a taxpayer is eligible for the subsidy, 
and if so, how much the subsidy would be.
146
 
In analyzing the specificity of the Washington incentives, the 
panel began with a de jure inspection of Washington House Bill 2294, 
the granting authority.
147
  This de jure inspection, according to the 
panel in the Boeing case ruling, analyzes the incentives in light of the 
respective code as a whole, rather than relying solely on the language 
of the amending legislation.
148
  Thus, the specificity analysis of the 
South Carolina incentives will likewise begin with a de jure inspection, 
during which the limitation placed on the incentives’ applicability will 
be considered in light of the entire code section in which the incentives 
are found. 
With respect to the sales and use tax exemptions for fuel provided 
by House Bill 3130, the language of the amended law creates de jure 
specificity.  The language of Sections 12-36-2120(9)(e) and (f) 
                                                 
143 Id. ¶ 7.190.  
144 Id. ¶ 7.190. 
145 Id. ¶¶ 7.190 - 91 (citing Panel Report, US –Subsidies on Upland 
Cotton, WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004)). 
146 SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 2.1(b). 
147 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.194.  
148 Id. ¶ 7.199.  
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explicitly limits the tax measures to the aerospace industry.
149
  For 
example, Section (9)(e) expands the sales tax exemption for coal, coke 
or other fuel sold to manufacturers to cover “the generation of motive 
power for transportation of aircraft by the manufacturer of the 
aircraft.”
150
  Likewise, Section (9)(f) provides a similar exemption for 
“the transportation of an aircraft prior to its completion from one 
facility of the manufacturer of the aircraft to another facility of the 
manufacturer of the aircraft.”
151
  The applicability of each of the above 
sections is limited to the “manufacturer of the aircraft,”
152
 which, like 
similar limitations in Washington House Bill 2294, qualifies the 
incentives as “expressly and unambiguously limited to enterprises 
manufacturing commercial airplanes.”
153
  According to the panel in the 
Boeing case decision, a subsidy will be considered as limited to certain 
enterprises if it is limited to a certain industry.
154
  Such a limitation may 
come about by a reference to “the types of products [the industry] 
produces.”
155
  Therefore, because the sales tax exemptions for fuel are 
limited to the aerospace industry, the sales tax exemption incentives 
will likely be considered de jure specific under the SCM Agreement. 
A de jure analysis of the remaining sales tax exemptions for 
computer equipment and construction materials leads to a different 
conclusion.  The sections providing these exemptions contain more 
general language and refer only to manufacturing facilities.
156
  Neither 
section suggests a limited application to the aerospace industry nor 
does either limit the applicability to certain enterprises.
157
 Therefore, 
these two sections will not likely be considered de jure specific within 
the meaning of Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement. 
 While all three of these sections appear in Section 12-36-2120, 
which contains subsidies relating to various industries including 
mining, quarrying, and farming,
158
 the panel noted in its analysis of the 
similar tax incentives of Washington House Bill 2294 that any 
preferential rate provided to other industries, whether in the same code 
                                                 
149 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-2120(9)(e), (f) (2010).  
150 Id. § 12-36-2120(9)(e) (emphasis added). 
151 Id. § 12-36-2120(9)(f) (emphasis added).   
152 Id. 
153 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.196.  
154 Id. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-36-2120(65), (67) (2010). 
155 Id. 
156 See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-36-2120(65), (67) (2010).  
157 Id. 
158 Id. § 12-36-2120.  
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section or elsewhere, constitutes possible “separate specific subsidies to 
the industries concerned.”
159
  Consequently, unless evidence was 
provided demonstrating “that reductions to separate industries are part 
of a wider, generally available and explicit programme of tax 
reductions,” the sales tax exemption for fuel, but not the other two 
exemptions or the income tax reduction, is de jure specific.
160
 
In fact, the remaining sales tax exemptions for computer hardware 
and construction materials most likely qualify as non-specific under 
Article 2.1(b), which provides that subsidies with objective eligibility 
conditions are non-specific.  The notes to this article of the SCM 
Agreement define objective criteria or conditions as being “neutral  . . . 
not favor[ing] certain enterprises over others, and . . . economic in 
nature and horizontal in application, such as number of employees or 
size of enterprise.”
161
  These “conditions must be clearly spelled out in 
law” and strictly applied.
162
  South Carolina has arguably passed this 
threshold.  The language of both exemptions limits the incentives’ 
application to use by a manufacturing facility, where “(i) the taxpayer 
invests at least seven hundred fifty million dollars in real or personal 
property or both comprising or located at the facility over a seven-year 
period; and (ii) the taxpayer creates at least three thousand eight 
hundred full-time new jobs at the facility during that seven-year 
period.”
163
  South Carolina’s legislation lays out criteria for eligibility 
that is arguably objective, namely the minimum requirement of $750 
million capital investment and creation of 3,800 new full-time jobs.  
Pending notification to the state, eligibility is automatic.
164
  
Furthermore, the state expressly retains the right to collect any tax due 
if the taxpayer fails to meet the mandatory, minimum requirements.
165
  
However, the eligibility requirements arguably fail the objectivity test 
in that the investment and job creation requirements are so demanding 
that they essentially exclude all but a certain few large enterprises like 
Boeing.  Nevertheless, cut-off standards are inherent in any eligibility 
requirement and the line must be drawn somewhere.   
However, despite passing the de jure specificity test under Article 
2.1(a) and qualifying as de jure non-specific under Article 2.1(b), the 
                                                 
159 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.204.  
160 Id. ¶ 7.205.  
161 SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 2.1(b) n.2.  
162 Id. art. 2.1(b).  
163 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-2120(9)(f) (2010). 
164 Id. 
165 See, e.g., id.  
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exemptions may still be found de facto specific under Article 2.1(c) of 
the SCM Agreement.  According to the panel in the Boeing case, even 
if a subsidy is de jure non-specific under Article 2.1(b), the subsidy 
may nevertheless “be found de facto specific under Article 2.1(c) of the 
SCM Agreement.”
166
  Article 2.1(c) provides catch-all factors that may 
be considered when a subsidy appears specific despite having qualified 
as non-specific pursuant to Article 2.1(a) and (b).
167
  As noted above, 
these factors include the “use of a subsidy programme by a limited 
number of certain enterprises, predominant use by certain enterprises, 
the granting of disproportionately large amounts of the subsidy to 
certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has been 




The income tax reduction and the computer hardware and 
construction materials sales tax exemptions are most likely de facto 
specific within the meaning of Article 2.1(c).  Although other 
manufacturing companies, such as BMW Manufacturing Company 
(which currently operates a plant in South Carolina), possess the 
financial means to surpass the investment and job creation thresholds if 
they were to expand operations in the state, Boeing is the predominant 
user of these subsidies.  In fact, circumstances suggest that these tax 
exemptions were enacted with Boeing in mind.  More specifically, 
these exemptions were passed in the same amending legislation as the 
Boeing-related general obligation bonds, for which former Secretary of 
the Department of Commerce, Joe Taylor, advocated in his January 8, 
2010 letter to the South Carolina State Budget and Control Board “for 
the benefit of The Boeing Company.”
169
  The timing of the amending 
legislation’s passage, which adds exemptions explicitly related to the 
                                                 
166 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.339 (citing Response of the United States to 
Question 145, U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), ¶ 128, WT/DS353 (March 22, 2007)). 
167 SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 2.1(c) ("If, notwithstanding any 
appearance of non-specificity resulting from the application of the principles 
laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), there are reasons to believe that the 
subsidy may in fact be specific, other factors may be considered.  Such factors 
are: use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises, 
predominant use by certain enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large 
amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion 
has been exercised by the granting authority in the decision to grant a 
subsidy."). 
168 SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 2.1(c). 
169 Letter from Joe Taylor, supra note 101. 
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aerospace industry, also coincided with negotiations between Boeing 
and the State of South Carolina, strongly suggesting a relationship 
between the two actions.  In the alternative, it is highly likely the panel 
would find that Boeing makes either the predominate or a 
disproportionally large use of these sales tax exemptions “consider[ing] 
the extent of diversification of economic activities within the 
jurisdiction of the granting authority, as well as the length of time 
during which the subsidy programme has been in operation.”
170
  
Although the legislation is relatively new, the subsidy’s high 
investment and job creation requirements exclude the majority of 
taxpayers and narrows the pool of eligible taxpayers to a much smaller 
group of large enterprises, such as Boeing.  If other enterprises are 
unable to achieve the investment and job creation threshold, a 
disproportionately large amount of the subsidy would be devoted to 
Boeing.  Thus, the potential that House Bill 3130 violates the 
restrictions in Article 2.1 against the “use of a subsidy programme by a 
limited number of certain enterprises, predominant use by certain 
enterprises [and] the granting of disproportionately large amounts of 
subsidy to certain enterprises,”
171
 is quite high.  
The FILOT tax reductions from Charleston County are likewise 
also de facto specific.  The granting authority, South Carolina Code 
Section 12-44-40, is broadly drafted so as not to explicitly limit its 
application to a certain enterprise, which protects the incentive from de 
jure specificity.  However, when combined with the related SSRC, 
Boeing receives a disproportionately large amount of subsidization.  
Not only does Boeing benefit from a lower assessment rate and a low 
fixed millage rate, but it is also rebated 50% of its payments for the first 
fifteen years, a subsidy valued at $53 million.
172
 
The economic development bonds are likely de facto specific for 
similar reasons.  While the amending legislation does not explicitly 
refer to Boeing, the aerospace industry, or even the manufacturing 
sector, the subsidy is also predominantly used by Boeing.  Section 11-
41-50(B) allows for “additional economic development bonds . . . in an 
aggregate principal amount that does not exceed one hundred seventy 
million dollars.”
173
  Boeing received the maximum $170 million 
allowable under this Section.  Therefore, Boeing has received a 
                                                 
170 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.752. 
171 SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 2.1(c). 
172 The Economic Impact of Boeing in South Carolina, supra note 87, at 
13. 
173 H.B. 3130, 118th Gen. Assemb. (S.C. 2009).  
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disproportionally large amount of the subsidy, which may not be 
utilized to the benefit of any other corporation. 
 
3.  WHETHER THE SOUTH CAROLINA INCENTIVES ARE PROHIBITED 
SUBSIDIES WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE SCM 
AGREEMENT? 
To determine whether the South Carolina incentives are 
prohibited subsidies, the panel would have to decide whether the South 
Carolina incentives are contingent, either in law or in fact, on export 
performance.
174
  The verbiage of the subsidy does not indicate a de jure 
export contingency or favoring of domestic goods, so the analysis will 
focus on de facto contingency.  A subsidy is de facto export contingent 
where “the facts demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy, without 
having been made legally contingent upon export performance, is in 
fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings.”
175
  
However, just because the recipient of a subsidy exports products does 
not automatically qualify the subsidy as export contingent.
176
  In prior 
cases, de facto contingency was found where the repayment terms for 
financing of “high-technology projects in the Canadian regional aircraft 
sector” were tied directly to sales of the aircrafts.
177
  In applying Article 
3.1(a), the panel focused on the word “contingent.”
178
  The panel 
explained, de facto export contingency “must be inferred from the total 
configuration of facts constituting and surrounding the granting of the 




Under these standards, the South Carolina legislation is most 
likely not export contingent.  In the current panel ruling, the business 
and occupation tax breaks from Washington, in conjunction with 
certain federal subsidies, were found to cause serious prejudice by 
means of “displacement and impedance of European Communities, 
exports from third country markets within the meaning of Article 6.3(b) 
                                                 
174 SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 3.1. 
175 Id. art. 3.1 n.4. 
176 Id. 
177 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.1517. 
178 Id. ¶ 7.1518. 
179 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of 
Civilian Aircraft, Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of the DSU, ¶ 167, 
WT/DS70/AB/RW (July 21, 2000). 
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of the SCM Agreement” with respect to the 100-200 and 300-400 seat 
product markets, “and significant price suppression and significant lost 
sales within the meaning of Article 6.3(c) in [those] product 
market[s].”
180
  The European Communities challenged the Washington 
state business and occupation tax reductions as measures intended to 
decrease marginal costs per aircraft, alleging the reduced cost led to 
serious prejudice against Airbus.
181
  The panel rephrased the issue as 
follows:  “[W]hether the availability of . . . B&O tax subsidies enabled 
Boeing to compete on price in individual sales, and secure sales that it 
would not otherwise have made, and where it did not win those sales, 
led to Airbus securing those sales at lower prices than it would 
otherwise have obtained.”
182
  In reaching its conclusion, the panel 
referred to US – Upland Cotton, in which the panel called for an 
“integrated examination of the effects of any subsidies with a sufficient 
nexus to the subsidized product and the particular effects-related 
variable under consideration” under Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c).
183
  The 
panel recognized that the business and occupation tax reductions, in 
combination with certain other federal subsidies, “enabled Boeing to 
lower its prices beyond the level that would otherwise have been 
economically justifiable, and that in some cases . . . it led to Airbus 
being able to secure the sale only at a reduced price.”
184
  The European 
Communities also argued, although the panel rejected this claim, that 
the Washington legislation was export contingent because it required 
Boeing to build a minimum of thirty-six aircrafts, which it argued was 
more than could be sold in the United States alone.
185
  The European 
Communities, therefore, claimed that the subsidy is arguably 




The economic requirements of capital investment and job creation 
used by South Carolina do not present the same ties to exportation.  
                                                 
180 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.1833. 
181 Id. ¶ 7.1801 (citing First Written Submission by the European 
Communities, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft, ¶ 1233, WT/DS353 (July, 11 2007), available at http://trade.ec.europa 
.eu/doclib/docs/2007/september/tradoc_136101.pdf).  
182 Id. ¶ 7.1814. 
183 Id. ¶ 7.1804 (citing Panel Report, US –Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 
7.1192, WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004)). 
184 Id. ¶ 7.1818. 
185 Id. ¶ 7.1475.  
186 H.B. 3130, 118th Gen. Assemb. (S.C. 2009); See also H.B. 2944, 58th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2004). 
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First, the magnitude of South Carolina’s incentives does not cause the 
same price suppression concerns as the combined Washington and 
federal subsidies.  The panel estimated the combined value of the 
Washington B&O and federal subsidies at $2,213,800,000, of which 
amount $2.2 billion is attributable to the federal subsidies.
187
  By 
contrast, the entire South Carolina incentive package has been 
estimated at $470 million.
188
  This is only a 21% share of the 
Washington and federal subsidies.
189
  Although the cost of 
development may discount slightly, it is unlikely that this amount will 
significantly suppress the cost of aircraft.  Furthermore, there is also no 
minimum aircraft requirement and the investment requirements do not 
indirectly support exports.  As mentioned above, “the mere fact that a 
subsidy is granted to enterprises which export shall not for that reason 
alone be considered to be an export subsidy.”
 190
  Therefore, although 
Boeing does export aircraft, this fact is also not determinative of export 
contingency.  Considering these facts, South Carolina’s incentives do 
not appear tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings 
and are therefore not prohibited. 
 
4.  WHETHER SOUTH CAROLINA CAUSES, THROUGH THE USE OF THE 
SUBSIDIES, ADVERSE EFFECTS WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 5(C) OF 
THE SCM AGREEMENT? 
The next step in the panel’s analysis would be an evaluation of 
whether any specific subsidy caused adverse effects to the challenging 
member state.  In past WTO cases, including the Boeing case, price 
undercutting has been proven “through a comparison of prices of the 
subsidized product with prices of a similar non-subsidized product 
supplied to the same market.”
191
  This comparison is made “at the same 
level of trade and at comparable times” or, if impossible, through a 
                                                 
187 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶ 7.1811. 
188 The Economic Impact of Boeing in South Carolina, supra note 87, at 
12. This amount includes all subsidies. The panel, on the other hand, looked 
only at certain subsidies for its calculation. Thus, the percentage calculation 
below is based off a numerator likely much larger than the panel would 
consider. 
189 Calculations were as follows: $470,025,000/2,213,800,000 = .2123 or 
21%. 
190 SCM Agreement, supra note 40, art. 3.1. 
191 Id. art. 6.5. 
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comparison of export unit prices.
192
  Under the second prong, the panel 
decides whether these effects were caused by the specific subsidies.   
In the Boeing decision, the panel examined “whether 
Washington’s B&O tax breaks positioned Boeing to (i) compete on 
price in individual sales, and secure sales that it would not otherwise 
have made,” or (ii) “where it did not win those sales, led to Airbus 
securing those sales at lower prices than it would otherwise have 
obtained.”
193
  Such a situation could occur because the B&O tax 
subsidies serve to either decrease the marginal unit cost or increase 
Boeing’s non-operating cash flow.
194
  Whether the panel looks at the 
marginal unit cost or the non-operating cash flow depends on the nature 
of the subsidy:  “[W]e consider it axiomatic that the nature of the 
United States subsidies at issue—in terms of their structure, design and 
operation—is relevant in assessing whether or not they have price 
suppressing effects.”
195
  Subsidies that are directly related to the 
production or sale of an aircraft require an analysis of the marginal unit 
cost, whereas subsidies that do not directly relate to the production or 
sale of an aircraft require an analysis of the non-operating cash flow.
196
 
 The majority of the South Carolina subsidies would fall into the 
latter category with the exception of the South Carolina tax measures, 
which closely mirror the Washington B&O incentives and would likely 
meet the same fate as the B&O tax measures.  The panel labeled it an 
“inescapable” conclusion that “in law the effects of the subsidies on 
Airbus’ prices and sales constitute significant lost sales and significant 
price suppression, within the meaning of Article 6.3(c) of the SCM 
Agreement, as well as displacement and impedance of exports from 
third country markets, within the meaning of Article 6.3(b)” at least 
with regard to Boeing’s 100-200 and 300-400 seat single-aisle 
products, although insufficient evidence was produced to validate a 
similar decision regarding 787 aircrafts.
197
  Both parties agreed that the 
B&O tax measures, considered together with certain federal subsidies, 
“lead to an increase in revenues after the transaction (the sale of an 
LCA),” meaning “both subsidies are directly tied to sales of individual 
                                                 
192 Id. 
193 U.S. – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), supra note 10, ¶¶ 7.1814, 7.1823-26. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. ¶ 7.1695 (citing Panel Report, US –Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 
7.1289, WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004)). 
196 Id. ¶¶ 7.1823-26. 
197 Id. ¶¶ 7.1822-26. 
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  More specifically, the panel acknowledged that “the 
subsidies lower taxes that Boeing pays and thereby increase Boeing’s 
after-tax profits.”
199
  Considering these facts, the panel determined that 
the B&O tax measures, along with certain federal subsidies, set Boeing 
up in a more favorable position than it could otherwise have 
achieved.
200
  First, these subsidies “enabled Boeing to lower its prices 
beyond the level that would otherwise have been economically 
justifiable, and . . . secur[e] sales that it would not otherwise have 
made.”
201
  These subsidies also, in certain cases, “led to Airbus being 
able to secure the sale only at a reduced price.”  As a result, the 
subsidies ultimately “served to entrench Boeing as the incumbent 
supplier, thereby putting it at an important switching cost advantage 
over Airbus in future sales of aircraft of the same family to that same 
customer.”
202
  The panel would likely find the South Carolina 
incentives that are similarly structured to the Washington incentives, 
including any income tax reductions or sales tax exemptions, likewise 
cause adverse effects to the interests of the European Communities for 
the same reasons. 
The above analysis and conclusion would also likely apply to the 
South Carolina economic bonds, which Boeing is receiving explicitly 
“to support Boeing’s 787 Program” in South Carolina.
203
  Under the 
South Carolina incentive package, Boeing will receive $270 million in 
non-repayable bonds alone, of which slightly over $200 million will be 
spent on the construction of the 787 assembly facility.
204
  Boeing will 
dedicate $10 million for the construction of roads and an additional 
$53.9 million for “site work and utilities.”
205
  The debt, including both 
principal and interest at a rate of 3.3%, will be repaid from South 
Carolina’s general operating fund.
206
  Because the facility is intended 
for work on the 787 product, these economic development bonds are 
tied to the production of a specific product.  Furthermore, the subsidies 
from the state decrease the fixed cost of the 787 plant’s initial 
production.  
                                                 
198 Id. ¶ 7.1806 (citing First Written Submission of the United States, 
United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶¶ 751-52, 
WT/DS353 (July 13, 2007)). 
199 Id. ¶ 7.1807. 
200 Id. ¶ 7.1818. 
201 Id. ¶ 7.1818. 
202 Id. ¶ 7.1818. 
203 Project Gemini Agreement, supra note 92, at 1. 
204 Id. at 3.  
205 Id. at 13.  
206 Id. 
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However, in coming to this conclusion, the panel will have to 
consider the fact that Airbus does not produce a product that directly 
rivals the 787.  The question then becomes whether it is possible to 
displace or threaten to displace the sale of an aircraft that is not yet in 
production.  It is typical that a more advanced aircraft would surpass an 
older version in sales to at least some degree.  Even if the South 
Carolina subsidies allowed Boeing to reduce the selling price of the 
new Dreamliner 787, the price reduction would not affect Airbus’ 
aircraft sales.  Most likely, potential buyers of the 787 would not 
consider Airbus’s older-version aircrafts an alternative product because 
the machines lack the new technology available in the 787.  If the panel 
were to determine that the production and sale of an aircraft for which a 
competitor has no direct rival displaces or impedes the import or export 
of a competitor’s aircraft, the panel would abolish competitive 
advantage within the industry. 
The second category of subsidies, comprising those that are not 
product specific, would be considered in relation to an increase in 
Boeing’s non-operating cash flow.  Of the South Carolina incentives, 
this would include the FILOT and the SSRCs.  In the Boeing case, the 
parties and the panel agreed that “where a subsidy is not tied to 
production of a particular product, the subsidy may still affect the 
behaviour of the recipient of the subsidy in a manner that causes 
serious prejudice, depending upon the context in which it is used.”
207
  
However, the panel found no significant adverse effects to the interests 
of the European Communities because the value of the remaining 
challenged subsidies—$550 million over the course of seventeen 
years—was de minimis and therefore irrelevant.
208
  According to a 
study by the consulting group Miley & Associates, Inc., the FILOT 
initiative, which reduced Boeing’s assessment rate to just 2% for fifteen 
years and 4% until year thirty, is worth $53 million.
209
  This amount 
would most likely also be deemed de minimis and irrelevant.  The 
South Carolina incentives present a lower total savings and a longer 
duration, which results in an even less significant average annual 
savings.  Thus, the South Carolina incentives are likely not prohibited 
under the SCM Agreement. 
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IV.   CONCLUSION 
Based on the information available and in light of the panel 
decision in the Boeing case, at least a portion of the South Carolina 
incentives would most likely be actionable under the SCM Agreement.  
An analysis of the incentives unveils the high likelihood that most, if 
not all of the incentives, including the tax breaks and general obligation 
bonds, are subsidies under the SCM Agreement because the incentives 
are financial contributions that confer a benefit on the recipient.  Of 
these subsidies, the sales tax exemption for aircraft fuel is de jure 
specific, while the sales tax exemptions for computer hardware and 
construction materials are de jure non-specific under Article 2.1(b) but 
de facto specific under Article 2.1(c).  Like the sales tax exemption for 
fuel, the general obligation bonds are de facto specific in that Boeing 
has received a predominant share of the available subsidy.  The 
available evidence does not suggest that any of these subsidies are 
export contingent; therefore, none of the subsidies are likely prohibited.  
However, the effects of the South Carolina tax and bond subsidies do 
cause significant lost sales and significant price suppression within the 
meaning of Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement, as well as 
displacement and impedance of exports from third country markets 
within the meaning of Article 6.3(b) for the 787 aircraft model.  In 
accordance with prior WTO rulings, the above result would command 
the panel to recommend, to the extent that the United States has acted 
inconsistently with the SCM Agreement, that the adverse effects be 
removed or the actionable subsidies be withdrawn as required by 
Article 4.7. 
However, South Carolina’s incentives will likely never come 
before the WTO panel.  The current Airbus-Boeing dispute 
demonstrates the impracticality of WTO rulings.  The current dispute 
has become the most expensive dispute in WTO history,
210
 and there is 
still no promise of an end in sight.
211
  Furthermore, the recent panel 
ruling resulted in a purported victory by both sides.
212
  Even Airbus 
itself admits that it does not anticipate a solution to this dispute for a 
number of years.
213
  In theory, the WTO panel’s ruling should rectify 
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the unjust subsidies and their effects.  However, the probability of such 
reaction is unlikely because the only repercussion of failing to do so is 
the imposition of trade sanctions by the injured country—a hefty 
decision that could spur retaliatory sanctions and other consequences 
potentially more harmful than the effects of the initial subsidy.
214
  As a 
result, both sides continue to offer and accept arguably illegal 
subsidies, such as those from South Carolina, while simultaneously 
arguing before the WTO.  
There is, however, some promise of reignited negotiations.
215
  
Even if the parties continue through the appeals process, it is almost 
certain that both will exit the WTO proceedings partially defeated.
216
  
At that point, both sides will most likely prefer to negotiate another 
agreement rather than either compensate each other for the illegal 
subsidies or enter into a trade war.  While a bilateral treaty may have 
been preferable to both parties, such a solution is likely no longer an 
option.  First, this option lost some of its viability when the panel 
released the following statement as part of its May 18, 2011 Appellate 
Body Report on the Airbus case, which cast serious doubt on the legal 
binding power of such bilateral treaties by emasculating the power of 
Article 4 of the 1992 Agreement:  “Article 4 of the 1992 Agreement is 
not a relevant rule of international law applicable in the relations 
between parties, within the meaning of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention.”
217
  More importantly, however, the industry is rapidly 
moving away from its duopolistic structure, which will render 
irrelevant a bilateral agreement that does not take into account the new 
market forces.  
Economic forecasts suggest that the aircraft manufacturing market 
will double in size to a value of $3.2 trillion by 2029.
218
  A number of 
emerging markets such as Russia, China, Japan, and Brazil are fighting 
for a share of the $1.7 trillion aircraft manufacturing market
219
 and are 
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receiving bountiful government subsidies to ease their journeys.
220
  
Russian aircraft manufacturers came together in 2006 as the United 
Aviation Corporation.
221
  China is contemplating a similar move and 
just reported that its Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China entered 
into a 100 plane contract for its first jetliner in November, 2010.
222
  As 
one market observer notes, the results of the WTO case will provide a 
detailed instruction manual for “Airbus’s and Boeing’s next generation 
of rivals” on how to successfully receive government aid.
223
  The 
entrance of new players in the aircraft manufacturing industry will 
certainly change the market environment significantly.   
In summary, while South Carolina’s House Bill 3130 appears to satisfy 
the requirements of the SCM Agreement at least in part, the European 
Communities would certainly have grounds for challenging the 
subsidies, although it’s unlikely the European Communities would do 
so.  More importantly, however, the aircraft industry is in the process of 
shifting out of a duopolistic structure.  Airbus’s and Boeing’s actions 
regarding subsidies will likely set precedent for these new players, 
who, with the help of their own domestic subsidies, will have the 
chance to usurp a significant portion of the market share from these two 
dueling rivals. 
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